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SCREENING THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER: THE
WRONG SOLUTION TO THE WRONG PROBLEM*
Thomas D. Morgan**
INTRODUCTION
Ann Andrews, an associate at Smith & West, has represented the
plaintiff in a personal injury suit. The defendant has been represented
by the firm of Davis & Baker. Now, Ann Andrews has left Smith &
West and been hired by Davis & Baker. Smith & West will continue
to represent the plaintiff in the law suit. May Davis & Baker continue
to represent the defendant?
The traditional answer is "no." Ann could not herself "switch
sides," i.e., represent the defendant after having represented the plain-
tiff in the case.' Even if Ann is assigned to other work at Davis &
Baker, whatever Ann may not do, the argument goes, her partners
and associates may not do either.2 Therefore, because Ann would be
"disqualified" from handling the defendant's case, her entire firm
must cease the representation of the defendant.
The principle that requires this result is known as the doctrine of
"imputed disqualification." The rule is harsh in a world in which
lawyers change firms-sometimes frequently-over the course of
their careers. It is a rule which some have proposed be modified to
reduce its impact on lawyers and clients alike. Until recently, how-
ever, the courts have refused to abandon the rule in cases such as the
one here described.
Increasingly, however, suggestions are heard that an entire law
* This article was the Spring 1987 Altheimer Lecture at the University of Arkansas at
Little Rock School of Law.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A. 1962, Northwestern Univer-
sity. J.D. 1965, University of Chicago.
1. The rule was firmly established in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): "[W]here any substantial relationship can be shown
between the subject matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse repre-
sentation, the latter will be prohibited." This rule has been consistently followed ever since.
E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978); Hull v. Ce-
lanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court,
370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966).
2. See, e.g., In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984); Fred
Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co.,
201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'dper curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962).
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firm should not be disqualified solely because it would be improper for
one partner or associate of the firm to handle a matter.3 In a case
described more fully later in this article, a federal district court has
held a firm not disqualified where the "tainted" associate was for-
mally "screened" from participation in the case.4
What are we to make of such a case and of the effort generally to
modify the heretofore strict rule of imputea disqualification? In this
article, I will take what may be an unpopular position. I will suggest
that the "screening" or "Chinese Wall" approach is inappropriate in
cases where the representation of a former private client is involved.
I will argue that screening misconceives the purposes of imputed
disqualification and is not responsive to those purposes. I will go on
to suggest that, instead of examining the viability of screening, the
courts should examine more carefully whether circumstances justify
barring the arguably disqualified lawyer in the first place.
BACKGROUND
We sometimes naively speak as though lawyer ethics have come
down to us from the unknowable past, with broad concensus and ex-
tensive precedent. Usually, of course, that is not the case at all.
The rule that an individual lawyer may not switch sides in the
same case is of relatively long standing. One hundred fifty years ago,
Baltimore lawyer David Hoffman wrote Fifty Resolutions in Regard to
Professional Deportment as part of a course of study which he offered
for young practitioners.5 Resolution VIII began: "If I have ever had
3. E.g., Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and
Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979); Note, Prospective Waiver of the Right to Disqualify
Counsel for Conflicts of Interest, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1074 (1981); Note, The Chinese Wall De-
fense to Law Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980). Cf Lindgren, Toward a
New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 419 (argues that
disqualification of attorneys should be disfavored as a remedy for violation of ethical stan-
dards). Two notable exceptions to this call for a fundamental change in approach to imputed
disqualification are C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.6.4 at 401-04 (1986) and De-
velopments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244,
1366-73 (1981). Some of the concerns about imputed disqualification have undoubtedly af-
fected courts that have established limits on so-called "double imputation," i.e., disqualifica-
tion of firms with which a previously vicariously disqualified firm are now associated. E.g.,
Arkansas v. Dean Food Products Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979); American Can Co. v.
Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971).
4. Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1986), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 29-34.
5. A one volume version of this course of study that has come down to us is D. HOFF-
MAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1968). Far more convenient for review of
these resolutions are H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 338-51 (1953), and ALABAMA LAWYERS
HANDBOOK 9-23 (1944).
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any connection with a cause, I will never permit myself (when that
connection is from any reason severed) to be engaged on the side of
my former antagonist." 6
That principle, in turn, became embodied in the third paragraph
of Canon VI of the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics: "The
obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent accept-
ance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely af-
fecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has
been reposed." 7
In its Formal Opinion 33,8 the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics considered the situation of attorney X who had been a member
of the firm of X & Y in 1903 when client A retained that firm to annul
her marriage. The ground for the annulment was that A was an im-
becile. Y had been trial counsel in the case, but X had done work on
the decree. Later, the firm of X & Y was dissolved and X formed a
partnership with C. Twenty-five years after the original annulment
suit, A sought to have a deed cancelled on the ground of her imbecil-
ity. A was represented in that suit by a new attorney, and the firm of
X & C was hired by the defense.
Should X & C be barred from defense of the deed recission be-
cause of X & Y's representation of A twenty-five years earlier? The
ABA Ethics Committee said "yes," the firm was disqualified. X's
firm maintained that A was an imbecile in the first suit, so X could
not maintain otherwise today. In sweeping language that has been
quoted and has controlled thinking about this area ever since, the
Committee held that X's law firm was barred as well: "The relations
of partners in a law firm are so close," the Committee wrote, "that the
firm, and all members thereof, are barred from accepting any employ-
ment, that any one member of the firm is prohibited from taking. '
Two RELATED SITUATIONS
Imputed disqualification is not limited to situations in which a
law firm wants to take the same case or a case substantially related to
6. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 753; H. DRINKER, supra note 5, at 339.
7. The Canons of Ethics are reproduced in, e.g., MORGAN & ROTUNDA, 1987 SELECTED
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 410-22 (1987); H. DRINKER, supra note 5, at
309-25. An annotated version is contained in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 11-197 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA OPINIONS].
8. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931), reprinted
in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 7, at 277.
9. Id.
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another in which one of its lawyers had been involved on behalf of a
private client. Two other situations present the same kind of issues.
The law has sometimes treated them differently-differently from
each other and from the former private client situation.
First, imputed disqualification has the effect of disqualifying a
law firm from handling a case against someone whom the firm is pres-
ently representing in another matter.10 This rule was not part of the
Canons of Ethics and was apparently first adopted by the ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics in its Formal Opinion 16.11 The ques-
tion raised was whether a law firm could handle criminal defense
cases which were being prosecuted by a partner in the same firm. The
Committee said no, citing the second paragraph of Canon 6: "'[A]
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose....' The prosecutor himself cannot represent both the
public and the defendant," the Committee reasoned, "and neither can
a law firm serve two masters."' 12
That kind of case is intuitively easy for most people, but imputed
disqualification is now routinely imposed even where the two cases in
the firm are wholly unrelated. In Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.,13
for example, an attorney was a partner in two law firms-one in New
York City and one in Buffalo. The Buffalo firm represented Ciner-
ama, a distributor of motion pictures and owner of theater chains, as
defendant in antitrust suits brought by other theater owners in upstate
New York alleging denial of access to popular films. At the same
time, the New York firm was representing a client which was suing
Cinerama for allegedly trying to acquire control of the client through
secret stock acquisitions. Even though the two cases were factually
unrelated, and even though the partner common to the two firms was
apparently not personally involved in either case, the New York firm
was disqualified from handling the suit against Cinerama. "One firm
in which attorney Fleischmann is a partner is suing an actively repre-
sented client of another firm in which attorney Fleischmann is a part-
ner,"' 4 the court reasoned. Thus, attorney Fleischman should be
10. E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978);
Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); Sapieza v. New
York News, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
11. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 16 (1929), reprinted
in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 7, at 254-55.
12. Id. (quoting CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1942), reprinted in H.
DRINKER, supra note 5, at 311).
13. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
14. Id. at 1386.
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deemed to be on both sides of the same case. The attorney had not
sufficiently shown "that there will be no actual or apparent conflict in
loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his representation,"' 5 so dis-
qualification was required.
The second imputed disqualification situation analogous to the
case of the former private client is the situation of the government
lawyer who has passed through the revolving door into private prac-
tice. Imagine that Ann Andrews, the lawyer whose career change
began this article, had worked for the SEC prosecuting insider trading
cases. She has left the agency to enter private practice and counsel
corporate executives on when they may and may not buy and sell
their companies' stock. First, may she give this kind of advice in pri-
vate practice? Second, if not, is any firm which she may join barred
from all insider trading work before or against the SEC?
It turns out that the ABA and reviewing courts have been quite
liberal in what they have permitted former government lawyers to do
in private practice. In the example just posed, even Ann herself
would not be barred from giving advice about insider trading the day
after she left government service. She would only be barred from rep-
resenting a private client in a "matter" in which she had had "sub-
stantial responsibility" while at the SEC.16 In this context, "matter"
refers to a particular case and not to a general substantive area of the
law.17 Ann would not be barred from giving advice, nor would her
firm be disqualified.
Even assuming that the private firm Ann joined had been defend-
ing a case actually being prosecuted by Ann, the firm would not now
have to withdraw. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility considered that express issue in its Formal
Opinion 342.18 The government would have a hard time hiring attor-
neys, the Committee reasoned, if those that it hired could not readily
make the transition to private practice. "So long as the individual
lawyer is held to be disqualified and is screened from any direct or
indirect participation in the matter" (including being excluded from
15. Id. at 1387.
16. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-101(B) (1980). The rele-
vant federal statute is 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982). That provision and the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 l(a) (1983) substitute the term "participated personally and
substantially" for the term "substantial responsibility" but the meaning is the same.
17. See, e.g., Allied Realty of St. Paul, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 283 F.
Supp. 464 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1969).
18. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975) was
first published at 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976).
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sharing in the fee for the case), the Committee reasoned, "the problem
of switching sides is not present." 19 That major qualification of the
imputed disqualification principle was later confirmed by the Second
Circuit in the case of Armstrong v. McAlpin,20 and seems to represent
settled law today.
THE MODEL RULES' TREATMENT OF THESE ISSUES
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility had been
extraordinarily terse in its treatment of imputed disqualification. Dis-
ciplinary Rule No. 5-105(D) said only: "If a lawyer is required to
decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disci-
plinary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm may accept or continue such employment."'"
That language clearly covered simultaneous representation of op-
posing sides, but as discussed above, the ABA read a screening possi-
bility into the language in the case of the former government lawyer.
The case of the former private client was more ambiguous, because
the Model Code nowhere explicitly prohibited switching sides in such
a case. The prohibition was developed by the courts from a generous
reading of Canons 4 and 9 of the Model Code,22 and imputed disquali-
fication was applied by analogy.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct represent an im-
portant effort to improve upon the Model Code's formulation and to
summarize the case law relative to imputed disqualification. The
problem with the Model Rules is that they tend to deal with the vari-
ous situations in which imputed disqualification is applied as if they
were properly seen as different. In so doing, I believe the Model
Rules may have missed a chance to fit the disparate rules into a coher-
ent whole.
19. Id. at 521. A similar result was reached by Opinion 889 of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York. 31 THE RECORD 552 (1976). See also, Morgan, Appropriate Limits
on Participation by a Former Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1.
20. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980)(en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1980). Before
1974, the provision imputed disqualification to the attorney's law firm in cases of conflict of
interest, but no others. The language "or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm" was
also added at that time. At the time, these were seen as "housekeeping changes." See C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 393-94; ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
246 (0. Maru ed. 1979).
22. See, e.g., Bd. of Ed. of New York City v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979);
Arkansas v. Dean Food Products Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384-86 (8th Cir. 1979); Schloetter v.
Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Model Rule 1.923 deals with the problem with which we began-
the problem of a lawyer's personally taking cases contrary to the in-
terest of a former private client. Such representation, without the for-
mer client's consent, is not proper (1) if the current case is the same or
substantially related to the matter in which the lawyer represented the
former client, or (2) if the present representation would involve the
lawyer's use of confidential information learned in the prior
representation.
Rule 1.10(a) then states the imputed disqualification rule abso-
lutely and in a way apparently applicable to all situations: "Where
lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly repre-
sent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohib-
ited from doing so .... ,24
Rule 1.10(b) then goes on to make the point with which we be-
gan this article-that a lawyer disqualified by actual knowledge of
client confidences gained at a prior firm disqualifies everyone in the
new firm which she joins.25 Conversely, however, a lawyer who
would have been only disqualified by imputation while in the prior
firm, and who in fact knows no disqualifying client confidences, is not
disqualified from taking a case contrary to that client of the prior
firm.
Rule 1.10(c) further qualifies imputed disqualification where a
personally disqualified person has left a firm. If no lawyer remaining
in the firm had in fact received any disqualifying information about
the client, i.e., all were disqualified solely by imputation from the per-
son who has now left, the firm's disqualification is thereby lifted.26
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) (1983).
25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) (1983). The language of
the rule is:
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly repre-
sent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a
firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose
interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had ac-
quired information protected by rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) [i.e. confidential information]
that is material to the matter.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(c) (1983). The rule specifi-
cally provides:
When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited
from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a
client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless: (1) the matter is the
same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer repre-
sented the client; and (2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected
by rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
1987-88]
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Finally, Rule 1.11(a) provides that while a former government
lawyer may not "represent a private client in connection with a mat-
ter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially"
while in government service, the firm in which that lawyer is practic-
ing is not disqualified if "the disqualified lawyer is screened from any
participation in the matter and apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom. 2
7
THE EFFORT TO GET JUDICIAL MODERATION OF THESE RULES
Once again, it is easy but misleading to suppose that today's rela-
tively clear rules are the product of many years of development. In
fact, however, the first major "former client" imputed disqualification
case seems to have been decided in 1954.28
The limits of the doctrine have been tested for some time during
the over thirty intervening years, but the most straightforward at-
tempt to qualify the rule was the 1986 decision of Nemours Founda-
tion v. Gilbane.29 That case involved a complex dispute surrounding
the building of an addition to a hospital. Basically, the prime contrac-
tor and a major subcontractor were suing each other, and also the
architect and mechanical engineer on the project.
On the lawyer disqualification issue, the facts were not in dispute.
Attorney Bradley had been an associate in the law firm which repre-
sented the mechanical engineer. That firm had been aligned with the
architect in the litigation. In April, 1984, Bradley had been asked by
his firm's principal litigating partner on the matter to prepare a set of
notebooks to be used by the participants in a "mini-trial" which the
parties hoped to use as a settlement device. The case did not settle,
and Bradley did nothing more on the case. He testified that he did
not even remember what documents he saw or whether any were pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege and not disclosed during the
settlement effort.
Sometime within the next year, Bradley left his former firm and
was hired by the firm which was local counsel for the subcontractor,
i.e., a party on the other side of the case. Bradley himself had nothing
to do with the litigation at the new firm, and indeed seems not to have
known that his new firm had any part in it until May, 1985.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (a) (1983).
28. Consolidated Theaters v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1954). A particularly important early case seems to have been W.E. Bassettt Co. v. H.C.
Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962).
29. 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1986).
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At that time, he met an attorney from the principal counsel for
the subcontractor who was visiting his new firm's office and whom he
had apparently met in connection with the mini-trial. Senior counsel
at Bradley's new firm figured out what happened, and it was agreed
that no one at the firm would talk with him about the case. All files
were previously and thereafter kept adjacent to the main litigator's
office, and not in the firm's file room. Thus, Bradley had no access to
them. Nevertheless, in November, 1985, counsel for the architect
moved to have Bradley's firm disqualified from further participation
in the litigation.
The court held that it had the authority to supervise the conduct
of attorneys appearing before it, including the authority to order their
disqualification.3 ° It also held that the architect had to be deemed to
have been a "client" of Bradley, even though Bradley's firm actually
represented the mechanical engineer. The two parties were aligned
together in the case, they held joint strategy sessions, and some of the
architect's documents were part of the "book" which Bradley pre-
pared. 3' Thus, Bradley himself clearly had to be disqualified from
taking part in the current phase of the litigation.
Of course, no one was seriously contesting Bradley's disqualifica-
tion. The question was disqualification of his law firm. As to that
point, the court discerned a seeming liberalization of imputed disqual-
ification under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as compared
to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
The court cited Rule 1.10(b), which we have seen provides in
substance that where an attorney leaves a firm representing one side
in a case, but in fact has done nothing on the case and knows nothing
about it, the lawyer does not disqualify the firm to which he moves.
Second, the court cited Rule 1.11(b) which provides that a former
government lawyer's firm is not disqualified if the lawyer is "screened
from any participation in the matter and apportioned no part of the
fee therefrom." Neither of the above rules was specifically applicable
to the facts before the court, of course, but the spirit of the rules
seemed to the court to modify the traditional no-exception application
of imputed disqualification.
The court was concerned that the case had already consumed
several years and that the cost of now switching counsel would be
30. Id. at 421-22 (citing Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir.
1972)).
31. Id. at 423-24 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir. 1978)).
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great both to the client and the progress of the case.32 The court con-
cluded that with proper screening the actual prejudice to the former
client would be minimal.33 Thus, the court held that Bradley's firm
should not be per se disqualified, provided that Bradley was continu-
ously kept under a "cone of silence" by his firm with respect to all
information concerning the case.34
THE POOR CASE OFTEN MADE FOR IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION
I am sure that the result in the Nemours case seems inherently
reasonable to many. It is consistent with what we know of the reality
of modern law firms. One advocate for change in the rule has written:
"Indiscriminate application of the firm-disqualification rule-a rule
fashioned in a day when law firms were small and intrafirm relations
informal-is no longer viable in the complex world of large firms."
35
As we all know, large firms today are simply not family-like places in
which everybody knows what everyone else is doing, much less what
client information each other knows.
The sense of unreality underlying firm disqualification is rein-
forced by some of the arguments used to justify the rule. It may be
argued, for example, that imputed disqualification is the inevitable re-
sult of applying agency law to the lawyer-client relation. Partner-
ships, including law partnerships, are made up of reciprocal
principal/agency relations."36 As Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.10
32. Id. at 430. The court also pointed out that the moving party had known of the possi-
ble conflict for five months before filing its motion. The court gently suggested that "mere
delay and harassment" might have motivated the motion at this point in the litigation. Id. at
431.
33. Id. at 429. At least two other cases involving former private clients have reached this
same result. See INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. I (E.D. Pa. 1983); Lemaire
v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
34. Id. at 428. The term "cone of silence" was a conscious invention of the court in this
case.
The conical image, a metaphor adopted from popular television, more appropriately
describes the responsibility of the individual attorney to guard the secrets of his for-
mer client. He is commanded by the ethical rules to seal, or encase, these particular
confidences within his own conscience. The term 'Chinese Wall' is suggestive of at-
tempts in the context of a large law firm to physically cordon off attorneys possessing
information from the other members of the firm who represent clients whose interests
are adverse to interests of these former clients. Such an approach tends to cast a
shadow of disrepute on attorneys separated in this manner from their professional
colleagues.
Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
35. Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
677, 714 (1980).
36. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9, 6 U.L.A. 132 (1914): "Every partner is an agent of
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puts it: "[A] firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of
the rules governing loyalty to the client.
' 37
Traditionally, what one agent of a firm knows, all members of
the firm are presumed to know. From this presumption of vicarious
knowledge,38 then, the case for imputed disqualification may be made.
Even a moment's reflection, however, suggests the weakness of this
analysis. The Second Circuit has written:
[I]t would be absurd to conclude that immediately upon their entry
on duty [lawyers] become the recipients of knowledge as to the
names of all the firm's clients, the contents of all files relating to
such clients, and all confidential disclosures by client officers or
employees to any lawyer in the firm. Obviously, such legal osmosis
does not occur.3 9
Indeed, except in the case of simultaneous representation, the ar-
gument is not even good partnership law. Partners are not literally
assumed to know everything each other knows. Instead, they are
charged with knowledge acquired in pursuit of the partnership's af-
fairs." Put another way, in a business firm in which communication
of information should occur, the legal rule assumes it has occurred so
as to require the firm to organize itself so that it will occur.
This kind of presumption about knowledge certainly does not ex-
plain imputed disqualification in a law firm setting, at least not in all
settings in which the rule applies. In the former client case, for exam-
ple, where Ann Andrews moved from Firm A to Firm B, she could
not, by definition, have acquired any disqualifying knowledge while in
pursuit of Firm B's affairs. The subsequent imputed disqualification
of Firm B, then, must depend on something other than the mechani-
cal invocation of agency or partnership law.4
the partnership for the purpose of its business .... "; Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 14A (1958).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 Comment 6 (1983).
38. This analysis evolved into what several cases have called a "conclusive presumption"
that all lawyers in a firm have shared the confidences and secrets of each other's clients. E.g.,
Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186,
197-98 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Swygert, J., dissenting); Celanese Corp. v. Leesona Corp. (In
re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation), 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976); Laskey Bros.
of W. Va., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955).
39. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d
Cir. 1975).
40. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 12, 6 U.L.A. 160 (1914): "[T]he knowledge of the
partner.., acquired while a partner ... [or which the partner] could and should have commu-
nicated ... to the acting partner, operate as knowledge of the partnership .. ; Cf RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 272-81 (1958).
41. Yet another incomplete justification for the rule is the American Bar Foundation's
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THE BETTER RATIONALE FOR IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION
If imputed disqualification of a law firm were, in fact, derived
thoughtlessly from agency law, perhaps an equally technical response
such as screening could be justified. When disqualification is seen as
the measured response to a real problem, however, one must evaluate
the response in terms of the reality. I believe that the disqualification
of Firm B is required by three realities of life in the modern law firm.
First is the relative informality of information exchange within
most law firms. This is not an argument that within a modern firm
everyone knows everyone else's business. It is a recognition of the
fact that people tend to specialize their work within firms and tend to
consult others in the firm who can give them necessary help on areas
outside their expertise.
Second is the powerful economic incentive to use information
that will help the firm win a case on behalf of a current client. Com-
petition for clients can be fierce today. Clients want to hire winners
and a record of being second best is not good enough for most firms to
succeed.42 Indeed, a highly-regarded American Bar Foundation
study of Chicago lawyers suggests that the fear of losing clients cre-
ates the single most important pressure to engage in less-than-clearly
ethical behavior today.43
Third and perhaps most important is the fact that no one outside
a firm-indeed often leadership inside a firm-can ever be sure what
has transpired behind the law firm's closed doors. One need not be an
unreformed cynic to see that the success of screening depends almost
entirely on the other side's confidence in the good faith and ability to
control conduct within the firm purporting to build the "Chinese
Wall," honor the "screen," or create the "cone of silence." Professor
Wolfram puts the matter well: "In the end there is little but the self-
serving assurance of the screening-lawyer foxes that they will care-
suggestion that imputed disqualification is designed "to prohibit a lawyer from circumventing
professional standards through partners, associates, or employees." ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 246-47 (0. Maru ed. 1959). The rule has that effect in part,
of course, but that is far from the rule's principal purpose. If affirmative circumvention of
specific prohibitions were the only concern, the Model Code would not have needed DR 5-
105(D). It already had DR 1-102(A)(2) which prohibits "circumvent[ing] a Disciplinary Rule
through actions of another." The rule of imputed disqualification is thus clearly designed as a
prophylactic rule. It is not primarily a rule to prohibit premeditated wrongdoing.
42. The pressures within a law firm today are discussed in A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PRO-
FESSIONALISM, "IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICES:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING
OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 8-9 (1986).
43. J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS 368-73 (1982).
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fully guard the screened-lawyer chickens." 44
I respectfully submit that these three observations are realities of
today's law firms. They are not necessarily unique to today, of
course, but they are concerns that all lawyers can understand. I be-
lieve that these are both the concerns that led the courts to the rule of
imputed disqualification and that now should dictate the courts' atti-
tudes toward screening.
45
SOME "COMPETING VALUES" CONSIDERED
If the arguments in favor of imputed disqualification are not
made persuasively, "competing values" which suggest the propriety of
screening can seem more important than they should.
First, imputed disqualification is sometimes criticized because it
tends to limit attorney mobility.46 If Ann Andrews, longtime counsel
to Litigant, wants to change firms, she will effectively be limited from
joining any firm now representing someone in a suit against Litigant.
That is clearly a practical limitation on Andrews' mobility, but is it a
consideration that should be of ethical significance?
At best, the concern for attorney mobility is a concern for the
welfare of attorneys, not clients. To be sure, of course, we often re-
flect concerns for attorneys' own interests in our ethical standards.
Indeed, our own interests sometimes seem to be put ahead of those of
our clients, the courts and the public.47
But when we are drafting ethics rules that way, at the very least
we ought to understand clearly what we are doing. All other things
being equal, there is probably no harm in designing ethical rules that
44. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 3, at 402.
45. The attorney-client privilege does not have to be sold to lawyers, but it may be useful
to recall that a concern about protecting valuable information is not unique to the legal profes-
sion. When trade secrets are disclosed to persons for specific, limited purposes, the law pro-
tects the disclosing person's rights in such information. The law recognizes that it is often
important for persons to be able to make disclosures with the assurance that the recipient of
the information will not then use it for his own benefit or to the detriment of the disclosing
party. In addition, the law of agency has treated as an implied term of the principal-agent
relationship that the agent would similarly respect the principal's right to information. I be-
lieve that this recognition of property rights in information is a useful way to think about the
lawyer's duty to protect the confidences and secrets of a client. We often like to think the rules
that apply to lawyers are "different" from the rules governing other mortals, but I believe that
it is properly humbling for us to see that lawyer ethic rules are neither unique to us nor matters
over which we have complete control.
46. E.g., Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1365-67
(1981).
47. This thesis is developed in Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibil-
ity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977).
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permit maximum attorney job mobility. It is simply not an objective
to be pursued if, in the process, significant client or public concerns-
such as client confidences-are potentially compromised.
Second, it is sometimes argued that an imputed disqualification
rule works a particular hardship in a city with only a few large firms.
The court in Nemours, for example, noted that there are only ten
large firms in Wilmington. They employ 40% of the county's law-
yers, and all but two of the firms were already involved in the case. If
one firm had to be disqualified, the court implied, the business of be-
ing local counsel might have to go to other than a "top-ten" firm.48
Surely, this argument falls of its own weight as well. Encouraging
firm growth and protection of local firms should not be independent
objectives to be valued in developing rules of ethical conduct. The
size and number of firms should evolve from the otherwise-justified
rules faced by those firms; the rules should not be driven by a desire to
keep firms large or the business local.
Third, and potentially most client centered, is the argument that
imputed disqualification tends to reduce clients' free choice of coun-
sel. If Litigant wants to hire Ann Andrews, for example, but An-
drews is disqualified because of her prior representation of Opponent,
Litigant will have to retain someone other than its first choice of
counsel.
Whether or not Litigant's frustration about taking second-best
should be something that justifies ethical concern depends in part on
why Litigant wants to hire Andrews. Litigant and Andrews or An-
drews' firm may have had a longstanding attorney-client relationship,
for example, which would be expensive and time-consuming to re-
create with another firm. If so, I believe that is a matter for legitimate
concern. It goes to the issue of effective and efficient service to the
client, and such concerns properly should be considered in design of
the ethical rule.
On the other hand, Litigant may have wanted to retain Andrews
precisely because Litigant thought Andrews, because of her prior rep-
resentation of Opponent, would be especially sophisticated about han-
dling a case against Opponent. It seems to me clear that the
information on which that sophistication is based should not be An-
drews' to sell. What will sometimes be a limitation of Litigant's free
choice, may in other cases simply be a restriction of Litigant's criteria
for the selection of counsel. The problem, of course, lies in designing
48. 632 F. Supp. at 429-30. The same concern worried the court in Lemaire v. Texaco,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
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an approach which will protect the legitimate concerns of Litigant
without infringing on those of her former client.
A PREFERABLE APPROACH TO DISQUALIFICATION
What, then, should be the proper approach to imputed disqualifi-
cation? Should the courts adopt a balancing test, for example?
Should all relevant factors be placed before the court and the decision
on disqualification simply be left to the judge?
I believe that that would be the wrong approach. While there
will always be close cases that will require judicial resolution, the best
ethics rules are those which are relatively uncomplicated and possible
for an attorney to apply in his or her own office. Courts which have
been uncomfortable with imputed disqualification are certainly cor-
rect that motions to disqualify have been used as tools for delay and
harassment.49 The Supreme Court has reduced the problem some-
what by holding that rulings on such motions may not be the subject
of interlocutory appeals."0 Federal Rule 11 may also provide a rem-
edy for baseless disqualification motions.5 1 However, it is essential
that the rule of imputed disqualification be no broader and no more
ambiguous or flexible than reasonably necessary to achieve its
purposes.
Must every firm be disqualified, then, no matter how slight one of
its members' connection with a case might have been, and no matter
when that contact was? Again, I believe the answer should be no. I
believe that the right answer to what is the best disqualification rule
can only be found if we ask-not whether one can screen the disquali-
fied lawyer from contact with others in the firm-but whether the
lawyer realistically should be said to have received enough of the for-
mer client's information that the court's protection is required.
This approach is consistent with that taken in ABA Model Rules
1.10(b) & (c).12 We saw earlier that those rules deal with the situation
of a lawyer who would have been disqualified by imputation had she
49. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982);
In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 470 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
50. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Flanagan v. United States,
465 U.S. 259 (1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). See also,
United States v. White, 743 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1984).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 was amended in 1983 to provide for the award of attorneys' fees to
a litigant burdened by the harassing tactics of an opponent. The rule has spawned a vast
number of Rule 11 awards. See, e.g., SHAFFER, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS
(1986); Batista, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Go the Best
Laid Plans?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1985).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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remained at her prior firm. However, where she in fact had not re-
ceived confidential information from a disqualified partner or associ-
ate at that prior firm, she would not be disqualified after she left the
firm. Nor would she be the cause of disqualification of her new firm.
The approach I am suggesting has the additional virtue of mak-
ing consistent the rule of imputed disqualification as it applies in the
simultaneous representation, former private client, and former gov-
ernment client situations. We have seen that the cases of simultane-
ous representation require disqualification and should. That is
because there is no de minimus case of conflicts in simultaneous repre-
sentation. Information from the client is still being received and
could be shared in ways that would be extremely prejudicial.
In the former government lawyer situation, on the other hand, I
believe screening is tolerated principally because the kind of informa-
tion developed by most government lawyers is not "secret" in the
sense that private information is. As I have argued elsewhere, statutes
such as the Freedom of Information Act give much government infor-
mation a different character than private information. 53 Screening is
imposed and tolerated only where we do not believe the information is
likely significant anyway, much as someone washes his hands before
eating even when his hands are not really dirty. Indeed, under Model
Rule 1.11 (a)(2), if the government is concerned that important secrets
might be compromised by the way screening is handled in the firm, it
has a basis to object and protect those secrets.54
Insofar as one can tell from an appellate opinion, the kind of
inquiry I am suggesting was properly made in Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 55 Attorney Schreiber was an asso-
ciate in a large New York law firm. He had worked there for about
thirty months before leaving to form his own small firm. While an
associate, he worked on bits and pieces of matters involving Chrysler
Corporation. After leaving the large firm, Schreiber filed suit against
Chrysler on behalf of a dealer whose rent had been raised, arguably in
violation of a written lease. His former employer sought to have him
disqualified. The district court refused to do so, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed.
Schreiber's involvement was, at most, limited to brief, informal dis-
53. This analysis of the cases is suggested in Morgan, supra note 19 at 38.
54. Rule 1.1 l(a)(2) reads: "[W]ritten notice [must be] promptly given to the appropriate
government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 l(a)(2) (1983).
55. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 10:37
THE DISQUALIFIED LAWYER
cussions on a procedural matter or research on a specific point of
law .... [W]e do not believe that there is any basis for distinguish-
ing between partners and associates on the basis of title alone-
both are members of the bar and are bound by the same Code of
Professional Responsibility. But there is reason to differentiate for
disqualification purposes between lawyers who become heavily in-
volved in the facts of a particular matter and those who enter
briefly on the periphery for a limited and specific purpose relating
solely to legal questions.56
The point of Silver Chrysler Plymouth is that, if there had been
bona fide confidences and secrets at stake, the court would have re-
quired disqualification. Minimum contacts with the case at the prior
firm, however, were not enough.
Interestingly, under my analysis, the Nemours case may well
have been rightly decided after all, even if its use of screening as a
solution to conflicts problems was wrong. Bradley, the young attor-
ney, had worked on but one part of the lawsuit in question. It was in
the settlement phase, and it was not at all clear that confidences of the
clients-not disclosed in the "mini-trial"-were involved. Even if
they were, his involvement had been so slight and so far removed that
he asserted that he remembered nothing." Certainly the burden of
proof should be on Bradley to show the client would not be compro-
mised, but the availability of a doctrine of imputed disqualification
does not itself require Bradley's disqualification in the first instance.
My proposed rule would not be without its close cases. Some
would require judicial resolution. But I believe the majority of cases
would be clear to the reasonable lawyer. The issue would be how
much connection the lawyer had with the case at the former firm.
Doubts about the degree and importance of prior involvement should
be resolved against the lawyer. "Screening" might be appropriate for
appearance sake where there would be no real harm if the "Chinese
Wall" were breached, but it should not be used where legitimate inter-
ests of the client are at stake.5"
56. Id. at 756 (citations omitted). Another good illustration of this approach is Novo
Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.
1979)(en banc).
57. 632 F. Supp. at 420-24.
58. This approach seems implicit in INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. I
(E.D. Pa. 1983). The court noted that the "client" had consulted a lawyer in the firm which
represented his opponent before that lawyer had time to run a conflicts check. The court did
not expressly accuse the client of "setting up" the firm, but it said that on the "peculiar facts"
of the case, including even a five month delay in filing the motion to disqualify, that "screen-
ing," not disqualification, was the appropriate remedy. Id. at 5-6.
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An alternative approach, of course, would be not to disqualify
lawyers and their firms at all in these cases, but rather to trust the
integrity possessed by the majority of lawyers and rely on the attorney
discipline process to deal with those lawyers who abuse their clients'
confidences.59 The problem with such a solution, however, is simply
that a client can often never know for sure when or whether his confi-
dence has been abused. That the trustworthy must suffer for the sins
of the rest is unfortunate, but client confidence must be the key. The
rules requiring imputed disqualification have been established in order
to prevent abuse before it happens. The discipline process is a neces-
sary but not a sufficient remedy for lawyer violation of professional
standards. A remedy which can only be invoked after the fact is often
no remedy at all.
In short, I submit that the proposed screening of disqualified law-
yers in order to permit their firms to continue representation in a
case-whether under the name of "screening," the "Chinese Wall" or
the "cone of silence"-represents the wrong answer to the wrong
question. It seeks to serve the interest of today's client, and today's
interest of law firms. It does so, however, at the expense of former
clients whose confidences the lawyer is every bit as obligated to
protect.
The right question is whether legitimate interests are at stake in a
case which require protection. The approach to imputed disqualifica-
tion proposed here will tend to focus the lawyer in the first instance,
and if necessary later a court, on that right question. If the burden of
proof is properly placed on the lawyer and the firm who are the sub-
jects of the disqualification motion, we ought to come as close as pos-
sible to sound decisions in these cases.
59. Such an approach is vigorously advocated in Lindgren, supra note 3.
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